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SUMMARY 
There has always been a common ground for a political union among the peoples of South-
eastern Europe, but somehow it has remained sidelined and mired in the turbid torrents of regional 
politics. The solution, which the small countries of Southeastern Europe could offer is a consociatio-
nal Balkan region which could only be a non-national state, where every ethnic, religious or linguistic 
group would have its own cultural infrastructure. It would be a political and economic merger facilita-
ting the consistency of cultural integrity. The Balkan Union could only be a democratic common-
wealth of people who are driven by a strong commitment to doing common work. It would not eli-
minate differences, but would only manage them towards peaceful coexistence without any infringe-
ment upon individual liberties. The implementation of this dream depends predominantly on a mutual 
effort by all Southeast European states. The results from such an effort can only bring about a signi-
ficant change for the better in the entire region, which is also important for the security and prosperity 
of Europe as a whole. The recognition of Southeast European heterogeneity is necessary for its future. 
Due to a crisis in knowledge production, the first step should be development of cultural exchange 
programs and pan-Balkan meetings, which would generate support for the idea of a Balkan Union. 
This is the topic on which this study hopes to provoke a discussion. 
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The recent movie The Matrix, which has already turned into a cult flicker for 
an entire generation, could be used as a comparison with the present-day situation 
in the Balkans. The pivot of the plot is the choice that the protagonist makes. He is 
offered a blue and a red pill. The blue pill will eliminate any knowledge of the 
choice he has made, while the red one opens the gates to the world of truth. Taking 
the red pill allowed the protagonist to cast off the limitations set up by the stereo-
types of the world he lived in, and established him on a journey of awakening self-
discovery. It is my conviction that at the junction of two millennia it is already 
hightime for the people of Southeastern Europe to make the choice between the 
                                                     
*
 Napomena hrv. ĉitatelju: u ovom broju Migracijske teme uvode oznaku »rasprave« za skupinu osobnih i 
katkad polemiĉkih priloga. Takav je zacijelo i ovaj prilog o Balkanu, koji uvelike odudara od prevladava-
jućih gledišta u Hrvatskoj. No dok u Hrvatskoj preteţe negativno ili »izvanjsko« vrednovanje pojma Balka-
na, a o neodrţivosti politiĉke asocijacije s balkanskim zemljama svjedoĉi nesretno iskustvo bivše Jugosla-
vije, u Bugarskoj, Grĉkoj i u zemljama koje nedvojbeno ulaze u tu regiju, ocjene su nerijetku pozitivne. 
Ovaj prilog mladoga bugarskog znanstvenika odraţava takvo gledište iz nama susjedne regije. 
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blue and the red pill: a choice between the too well-known wasteland of antago-
nism and confrontation, and a new world full of opportunities to generate change, 
cooperation, and peaceful coexistence. The solutions, which any foreign power can 
offer for solving the problems in the region, can never be durable in the long run 
unless they are supported by the Balkan nations; otherwise they would only be a 
source for more confrontations. Superpowers come and go in the political theatre 
of the region, but the people, who live here and call this peninsula their home, stay 
and have to suffer the consequences of foreign incursions. That is why a consocia-
tional Balkan Union is the solution, which the small countries of Southeastern Eu-
rope could offer towards the stabilization of the region. This is the topic on which 
this study hopes to provoke a discussion. 
A consociational union offers the prospect of a genuine antithesis to the im-
broglio of turbid nation state existence. The contemporary version of the nation 
state in the Balkans can no longer be upgraded, because its very essence is, in ge-
neral, contradictory to notions such as individual freedom and peaceful coexistence. 
Southeast European nationalism flipped the script of individual self-determination 
by thwarting its strive towards the establishment of a democratic community and 
imposed on it enemy images derived from the benighted interpretation of the pa-
limpsest of history. This, in turn, led to a bifurcation in the understanding of natio-
nal identity: once as a cultural and once as a political phenomenon, which elevated 
nationalism to the status of all-permeating ideology (Barry, 1991: 352). The issue 
of nationalities ought to be viewed on the level of individual liberties and human 
rights. In this way the various national yearnings are going to be guaranteed via the 
exercising of personal freedom. This would provide the ground for the separation 
of state and nation and for gaining the accrue of long-term peace in the Southeast 
European region. Thus, within the framework of consociational union, Balkan na-
tionalities would be viewed as free associations separate from the civil and political 
organization of the state. And this, per se, forms the quiddity of consociational 
multinational states: they proffer a more realistic and democratic environment to 
their citizens, which abrogate the nebulous, expansionist mythology of imagined 
nation states. The parochial perspective of ethnocentric mentality has jettisoned the 
region into the backyard of modern development. 
For the last ten years the region of Southeastern Europe has become a hack-
neyed expression for instability and backwardness in the world media. Violent in-
tercultural conflicts have ruptured the fabric of Balkan societies. The fall of the 
iron curtain awoke the dormant spectres of history and revived memories of the 
days when the region was better known as “the powder-keg of Europe”. The turn 
of the 20
th
 century finds the unstable Southeast European region in the same, if not 
more, precarious situation as at the turn of the nineteenth century. It is history, 
which is traditionally blamed for the problems of the beleaguered Balkan region. 
But if one were to look more carefully under the surface of history he or she would 
immediately stumble upon the forgotten roads to peaceful coexistence among the 
different ethnic groups in Southeastern Europe. Not so long ago there was a strong 
intellectual movement in the region, which espoused to the ideals of federalism and 
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unionism. It is as a result of this movement that the idea of a Balkan federation 
came forth. And it is my firm belief that any attempt for a peaceful settlement of 
the conflict in the region would fail in the long run, if it were not put in the context 
of the dream of a Balkan Union. 
The dream of a Balkan Union 
The idea of a federal union in Southeastern Europe is not new to the region 
(Padelford, 1935). Some have even been tempted to view the ancient Hellenic, Bul-
garian and Serbian empires as instances of this idea; and the Ottoman empire, per se, 
as a “federation of theocracies under the scepter of the Sultan”(Geshkoff, 1940: 14). 
But these assumptions are incorrect, because they misrepresent the genuinely de-
mocratic nature of the idea of a Balkan Union. It did not have as its objective the 
revival of any of the old regional empires, but rather it aspired to the formation of a 
completely new system of government and state. In many respects the idea of a 
Balkan Union, as it emerged in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, vie-
wed the memory of the ancient Balkan monarchies as detrimental to its objectives: 
But let us [the Balkan peoples] leave our sins behind, and let us lock our an-
cient history, on which we can look only as a source of evil and misery… The 
quarrels, which existed between us 450 years ago, are the reason for our 
plight today (Каравелов, 1870; emphasis added). 
For the revolutionary leaders at the dawn of the anti-Ottoman struggle, the 
recollection of the old Balkan empires posed a hurdle for the prosperity and secu-
rity of the region. Even at this early stage, it was obvious that the peace of the Bal-
kans depended on the ability of the different peoples to find ways for making the 
future their priority, rather than drowning in the memory of the past. The vision of 
a prospective union of the different Balkan peoples drove them to take part in each 
other‟s national struggles. It is germane to add that in this process was spurred the 
development of a higher community consciousness, which formed the backbone of 
Southeast European patriotism. In this way the different anti-Ottoman movements 
in the region, could be easily designated as Balkan. The revolutionary leaders 
spoke of the fundamental human rights of the peoples living in Southeastern Eu-
rope. They reasoned out that the nation consists of individuals, whose rights and 
freedoms should be recognized and protected, because “national affiliation is a re-
sult of a conscious act by the individual”(Ivanov, 1996: 31). And in the Balkans 
this could happen only when the rights and freedoms of individuals from all na-
tions in the region are recognized. Hence, the only way to alleviate the misery of 
oppression was by fostering a spirit of brotherhood. This provided fresh hope that 
the darkness of oppression could be dispersed with the joint effort of the in-
dependent Balkan nations. This is the idiosyncratic aspect of all Balkan nationalism 
movements. Their objective was the creation of independent national states. They 
were the prerequisites that would prepare the ground for the union of the inde-
pendent Balkan nations. Because “Union is the death of tyrants. If the nations wake 
Emilian Kavalski: The Balkan Way to Regional Conflict Solving, Migracijske teme 16 (2000), 3: 289–300 
 292 
up and in thousands of voices uphold this great truth, only then will they be able to 
enjoy happiness and peace”(Каравелов, 1871). 
This is how the idea of the establishment of a Balkan “federation of indepen-
dent nationalities” was proffered (Каравелов, 1871). The formation of a national 
consciousness as a step towards federalism was an important facet of the Balkan 
liberation movements. The dream of a union was founded on the existence of a 
shared consciousness among the peoples of Southeastern Europe. 
The vitality and inspiration of this image were tested in the 1930s during a 
series of Balkan Conferences, which challenged the status quo of the nation-state 
and proffered the bold and daring prospective of a genuine Southeast European fe-
deration as the first step to a distant “pan-European state” (Манчев, 1931: 51). The 
1930s, per se, were marked by a growing perception that people in the Balkans were 
part of one common Southeast European community (Padelford, 1935: 11). But it 
is also important to mention that these conferences in a way challenged the status 
quo of the nation-state and proffered the bold and daring prospective (or what some 
might call utopia) of a genuine Southeast European union free from the limitations 
of national ideologies. Subconsciously, and perhaps not aware of what they were 
adumbrating, some of the delegates were calling for a more innovative approach to 
solving conflicts in the region. Even then it was obvious to some that traditional 
methods of hostilities regulations based on interstate relations were not working, 
because ethnic tensions are different in nature and are not subject to third-party 
power-based mediation. 
Most ethnic conflicts involve the rights of ethnic groups to maintain their 
identity, to have equal status with other groups, and to have equal access to 
decision-making. Societies with ethnic differences often divide along ethnic 
lines in such a way that some ethnic groups are forced to integrate into the 
national culture of the state in which they find themselves, the threat to their 
identity can readily lead to frustration, polarization and violence (Miall, 
1992: 141). 
Thus the nation-state cannot and could not with political tools resolve or in-
fluence ethnic tensions; it can only exacerbate them. Taking into account the wider 
perspective and all-permeating nature of ethnic conflicts calls for a broader ap-
proach to the problems of the Balkans. 
The Balkan way 
The perception of the common future of the different nations in Southeastern 
Europe was the main reason for embarking on this essay. Getting traction on in-
tractable conflicts – particularly those that involve ethnic, religious, and linguistic 
groups with deep cultural differences between them – has always been a challen-
ging issue. The developments in the Balkans in the last decade have emphasized 
the lack of cooperation among the countries in the region. Moreover, they have ac-
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centuated the inability of various ethnic groups to find ways for peaceful coexi-
stence. It is my distress and anguish over the present unfolding of the Balkan crisis 
that urged me to write these pages with the hope of generating a discussion on the 
possibility of creating a Balkan federation in the region. 
There is a nascent necessity for a new kind of realm to cope with the con-
temporary developments in the Southeastern Europe. The region needs to re-estab-
lish internal security, empower civil society, and strengthen democratic institutions. 
In the post-Cold War Balkan experience the value of place has increased to an ex-
tent that it is no longer sufficient to belong to an abstract notion of society but to 
somewhere “in particular” (Sennett, 1997: 162) which has led to the evolution of 
ethnoanarchism. But as global civil society grows and becomes more robust the 
role of nation-states is changing. Every nation will inevitably learn that to defend 
its interest in a globally and technologically integrated planet greater effort will 
have to be devoted to multilateral strategies. Localities would and should no longer 
be viewed as refuges or safe heavens surrounded by belligerent others, but as ports 
of integration and cooperation. Differences borne out of age-old isolation gradually 
disappear with the advancement of new technologies. Group identity, as we know 
it today – be it local, regional, or national – would be altered to a degree that con-
temporary sagacity cannot predict. The diversity of communities should be realized 
as a repository of prospects for the future of the Southeast European region. 
In this train of thought it is very commendable that recently the Balkans have 
been witnessing a “new” type of developments: the reawakening of regional coope-
ration. The conspicuous inference from these developments is that the Balkan re-
gion is at a turning point to break away from the vicious circle of violence, oppres-
sion, and instability. One instance came as a result of the NATO air strikes against 
Yugoslavia during its Kosovo campaign. The air strikes destroyed vital infrastruc-
ture not only for Yugoslavia, but also for the entire Balkan region, closing effec-
tively the easiest land route for many Balkan states to transport goods to and from 
the rest of Europe. The destruction of several bridges spanning the Danube River 
and the virtual closure of this waterway cut a vital link to Europe for countries like 
Romania and Bulgaria. In the aftermath of these events the Balkan states united 
their efforts for requesting compensation for their losses. One example is the joint 
declaration by the governments of Macedonia, Bulgaria, and Romania to the fo-
reign ministers of the European Union. Moreover, in December 1999, at the EU 
Summit in Helsinki, Finland three Southeast European states – Bulgaria, Romania, 
and Turkey – have been invited to start talks for a full integration into the European 
Union. Before that, in November, 1999, the Organization for Security and Co-
operation in Europe held its forum in Istanbul, Turkey, which drafted the Charter 
for European Security signed by the majority of Balkans‟ heads-of-state. The capi-
tal of Bulgaria, Sofia, hosted the First Southeast European Economic Forum where 
regional finance ministers, funding institutions, and NGOs met to discuss regional 
economic cooperation and the common future of the Balkans. In the post-Cold War 
period the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Zone has been developed as a signifi-
cant tool for regional cooperation and Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, and 
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Turkey have been among its most active members. The wake of these events indi-
cates a shift in political mind-set to one that fosters openness and recognizes and 
efficiently utilizes the resources and skill resident in the new global civil society. 
Nevertheless, the crisis in former Yugoslavia and its subsequent break-up 
has crudely outlined the quagmire of Balkan politics and their volatility. In the 
post-Cold War period the Balkan states were left out of the main stream of inte-
grational processes sweeping across Central and Western Europe. That is how the 
region, per se, remained in the periphery of European politics. Stuck in the mud of 
primordiality, the Balkans have posed a major challenge to the centralist model of 
the unitary state. Ethnicity remains an important resource for organizing collective 
political action in the Balkans. The emerging democracies of the region are bur-
dened by its inheritance; but living beyond the boundaries of ethnic identity is 
something inconceivable in the region. Southeast European isolation revived the 
old ghost of history and allowed for their spectres to resuscitate ancient fears and 
hatreds. The change of 1989, when most communist regimes in Eastern Europe 
were ousted from power, was driven by a rejection of the overbearing, centralized 
dictatorship of the state and its heritage of repression. In the Balkans an idio-
syncratic aspect of this process was the search for a new identity. A majority of the 
people living in Southeastern Europe were expecting a new, utopian alternative to 
replace the old order. Many people expected that democracy would automatically 
solve the problems posed by multinational coexistence and few addressed the issue 
of emancipation of different ethnic groups. But when this did not occur many na-
tions looked back to the memory of their “glorious” past, which consequently 
brought to the fore the clash between democracy and nationalism. This substitution 
of reality plunged the region into its present day confusion. As a result the present 
states of the Balkan Peninsula became an epitome of a new form of nationalism – 
ethnocentrism, which claims an absolute superiority based entirely on whether a 
person is viewed as a member of the group or alien to it. 
It is in the wake of these developments that the dream of a Balkan Union, 
and particularly the very reality of the Balkan Conferences during the 1930s, sug-
gests that the opportunities for a finding an enduring peace for the region are far 
from depleted. The first half of the 1930s saw Southeast European societies eagerly 
debating the prospect of regional cooperation. Today, most of them discuss and 
work for an integration with the European Union. To a great extent this is indica-
tive of the legacy of Balkan federalism and the momentum it generated. 
In the context of contemporary developments in the region the idea of a 
Balkan Union is perhaps the only viable approach to conflict resolution in South-
eastern Europe. For one thing, in the Balkans, people as well as states were ready, 
at the beginning of the 1990s, to embrace the idea of their common destiny with the 
rest of Europe in a true European Union. The break-up of the former Communist 
Bloc was very much driven by a desire to stamp out the dominant position of the 
state as such and allow for individual diversity. Looking at the complexity of the 
Balkan conflict, I believe that the only durable solution to the problems of South-
eastern Europe is the creation of a Balkan Union. In today‟s multicultural world the 
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reliable path to peaceful coexistence and creative cooperation should start from 
self-transcendence, both on the individual and national level. Transcendence mar-
ked by the need to overcome historical limitations. 
The implementation of the idea of a Balkan Union would counter the clash 
of different interests in the region, because its realization can be achieved only 
through a genuine and dedicated participation of all the states in Southeastern Eu-
rope. The seeds of this cooperation have been planted for many years now, today 
they only need the proper cares to grow and bloom. The Balkan Union unlike any 
other attempt of conflict solving in the region is not going to be of short-term dura-
tion. This is mainly because it would involve not only governmental commitment 
to the process but also the active participation of ordinary people. The driving force 
behind it would be not only the recognition of particular ethnic and national rights, 
but mainly the establishment of a civil society in the region. That is why, I believe, 
that the idea of the Balkan Union can be implemented only through the active parti-
cipation of non-governmental organizations. The Southeast European governments 
cannot create a Balkan civil society through bills or laws. This is a process that 
should be initiated by the very people who call the Balkans their home. This pro-
cess would entail a change of vision as well. A turn from looking back into the past 
for finding the explanation of contemporary issues to making the future the pre-
rogative. This would be a difficult process, but not necessarily an impossible one. 
The implementation of the dream of a Balkan Union depends predominantly 
on a mutual effort by all Southeast European states. Once generated this mutual ef-
fort would in a snowball fashion clear the way for the achievement of this idea. The 
results from such an effort can only bring about a significant change for the better 
in the entire region, which is also important for the security and prosperity of Eu-
rope as a whole. Recent developments have indicated that ideas for more closer 
cooperation and integration are not foreign to the region. 
It should be taken advantage of this momentum to further the process of re-
gional cooperation. The recognition of Southeast European heterogeneity is neces-
sary for its future, and the willingness to work within it and perhaps through it is 
the region‟s destiny. It is often overlooked that the endemic separatism of South-
eastern Europe has also led to a crisis in knowledge production, which hampers the 
social, cultural and economic well-being of the region and has sentenced the region 
to its present-day backwardness. That is why the first step should be development 
of cultural exchange programs and pan-Balkan meetings, which would generate 
support for the idea of a Balkan Union. 
Parallel to the process of knowledge-exchange should be initiated a process of 
developing a common Balkan market, defence strategy, and foreign policy among 
the different Balkan governments. Integration along political, defence, and economic 
lines would cause less, if any, stress to ethnic selfhood. Cultural identity has always 
been the major source of conflict for Southeastern Europe. The residue of nationa-
lism and most importantly the suspicion of the “other” born out of it has been the 
major obstacle to the fulfilment of federalism. The ingenuity of the Balkan Confe-
rences was to proffer political and economic integration, while individual identity 
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remains unchallenged. They also indicated the important function of non-govern-
mental organizations for generating public support for the idea of unionism in the 
region. Their main role is to work for the establishment of a civil society based on the 
recognition of the basic human rights of all ethnic groups and the knowledge of the 
common destiny of all people who live in Southeastern Europe. This would urge the 
reluctant Balkan governments to look more favourably on this process. 
A very important factor for the creation of a Balkan Union is the existence of 
a supra-national, rudimentary form of Balkan consciousness. This shared cultural 
identity, could help in transcending the limitations of ethnic and national attach-
ment. Southeast European folklore with its symbols of cooperation and friendship 
undermines the nationalist and separatist ideologies of the region. In other words 
the role of non-governmental organizations is to accentuate these and help for the 
creation of a Balkan civil society before the formation of a united Balkan state. 
The Balkan Union could only be a supra-national state, where every ethnic, 
religious or linguistic group would have its own cultural infrastructure; for it is 
inherently inclusivist, embracing all portions of the population. In other words the 
prospective pan-Balkan state could be a consociational union among the different 
Southeast European states. Consociationalism is driven by the contemporary tide in 
civil societies towards inclusion, and infers that diverse communities are predispo-
sed to effect political integration if the dominant borders of cultural partition bet-
ween them remain unquestioned (Lijphart, 1977). Only a consociational federation 
could differentiate between the state and the national consciousness, because every 
citizen would enjoy equal political and human rights regardless of nationality. This 
would also call for a transcendence of nationality as a political entity to a cultural 
phenomenon. This would be a step for the establishment of a higher community 
consciousness, which would harmonize with the necessity for economic and cultu-
ral cooperation in the region. Consociational arrangements provide options for po-
wer sharing between different groups since they are based on the concept of sepa-
rate but equal. Consociational principles do not force populations to move into eth-
nically pure enclaves, which would be tantamount to recognizing ethnic cleansing, 
but allows each group to administer its community needs, such as education. 
In other words the Balkan Union could only be a non-national state, where 
every ethnic, religious or linguistic group would have its own cultural infrastructure. 
It would be a political and economic merger facilitating the consistency of cultural 
integrity. The uniqueness of such a political formation lies in the fact that it provides 
answers on the individual level. The Balkan Union could only be a democratic com-
monwealth of people who are driven by a strong commitment to doing common 
work. Being a macro-political model of conflict regulation, it would not eliminate 
differences, but would only manage them towards peaceful coexistence without any 
infringement upon individual liberties. 
*   *   * 
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These are some of the issues that could be a starting point for debating the 
future of the Balkans. There has always been a common ground for a political 
union among the peoples of Southeastern Europe, but somehow it has remained 
sidelined and mired in the turbid torrents of regional politics. I insist that a pros-
pective Balkan Union would be the only viable solution to the problems of the re-
gion; and I am convinced that the present has made this conclusion obvious. Con-
flicts in the Balkans can be resolved only on the basis of shared interests, and this 
paper has been an invitation to converse on the issues it raises. It has been written 
with the inclination to pose the question of Balkan federalism without attempting to 
engage specific authors or texts, which could make it in the eyes of some more 
academically minded like a straw theory. But I believe in the better fate of South-
eastern Europe and that history is full of surprises. 
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Emilian Kavalski 
BALKANSKI PUT ZA RJEŠAVANJE REGIONALNOG SUKOBA 
SAŢETAK 
Glavni razlog pisanja ovog rada je percepcija zajedniĉke budućnosti razliĉitih naroda u jugo-
istoĉnoj Europi, a to je mogućnost stvaranja balkanske federacije. Kao usporedbu sa sadašnjom situa-
cijom na Balkanu autor navodi kultni film Matrix. Kljuĉna toĉka zapleta u filmu je izbor protagonista 
izmeĊu plave i crvene pilule – izbor izmeĊu već predobro poznate pustoši antagonizma i konfronta-
cije i miroljubive koegzistencije. Rješenja koja neka strana sila moţe ponuditi za probleme u regiji ni-
kada ne mogu biti dugotrajna ako ih ne podupiru balkanski narodi; inaĉe bi bila samo izvorište novih 
konfrontacija. Velike sile dolaze i odlaze u politiĉkom teatru regije, ali ljudi koji ovdje ţive i ovaj po-
luotok nazivaju svojim domom ostaju i moraju trpjeti posljedice stranih upada. Zbog toga konsocija-
cijska balkanska unija predstavlja rješenje koje male zemlje jugoistoĉne Europe mogu ponuditi za 
stabilizaciju regije. Namjera ovog rada je potaknuti raspravu baš o toj temi. Autor smatra da pitanje 
nacionalnosti valja promatrati na razini individualnih sloboda i ljudskih prava. To bi osiguralo temelj 
za odvajanje drţave i nacije i pridonijelo stvaranju dugotrajnog mira u jugoistoĉnoj europskoj regiji. 
Tako bi se, u okviru konsocijacijske unije, balkanske narodnosti promatrale kao slobodne asocijacije 
odijeljene od graĊanske i politiĉke organizacije drţave. Zadnjih deset godina regija jugoistoĉne Eu-
rope postala je otrcanim sinonimom za nestabilnost i zaostalost u svjetskim medijima. Ţestoki inter-
kulturalni sukobi razorili su strukturu balkanskih društava. Pad ţeljezne zavjese probudio je uspavane 
povijesne sablasti i oţivio sjećanja na dane kada je regija bila poznatija kao europsko »bure baruta«. 
Na izmaku 20. stoljeća jugoistoĉna europska regija nalazi se u istome, ako ne i neizvjesnijem polo-
ţaju nego na izmaku 19. Autorovo je uvjerenje da će bilo kakav pokušaj rješavanja sukoba u regiji na 
kraju propasti ako se ne stavi u kontekst sna o balkanskoj uniji. Ta unija moţe biti samo nadna-
cionalna, odnosno nenacionalna drţava, gdje bi svaka etniĉka, vjerska ili jeziĉna skupina imala vlas-
titu kulturalnu infrastrukturu. To bi bilo politiĉko i ekonomsko udruţivanje koje bi olakšalo koegzis-
tenciju kulturnog integriteta. Jedinstvenost takve politiĉke formacije leţi u ĉinjenici da ona osigurava 
odgovore na individualnoj razini. Balkanska unija bi mogla biti samo demokratsko nezavisno tijelo 
ljudi koje pokreće snaţna predanost zajedniĉkom poslu. Kao makropolitiĉki model reguliranja sukoba 
ona ne bi eliminirala razlike nego bi ih samo usmjerila prema miroljubivoj koegzistenciji bez ikakva 
narušavanja individualnih sloboda. Promatrajući kompleksnost balkanskog sukoba, autor vjeruje da je 
jedino trajno rješenje problema jugoistoĉne Europe stvaranje balkanske unije. Implementacija te ideje 
neutralizirala bi sukob razliĉitih interesa u regiji jer se njezino ostvarenje moţe postići samo istinskim 
i poţrtvovnim sudjelovanjem svih drţava jugoistoĉne Europe. Unija ne bi ukljuĉivala samo angaţi-
ranje vlada nego i aktivno sudjelovanje obiĉnih ljudi. Jednom pokrenut, taj zajedniĉki napor bi poput 
grude snijega oslobodio put za ostvarenje te ideje. Rezultati takvog napora mogu samo dovesti do 
vaţne promjene na bolje u cijeloj regiji, što je vaţno i za sigurnost i boljitak Europe u cjelini. Nedavni 
dogaĊaji su pokazali da ideje tješnje suradnje i integracije u regiji nisu nepoznate. Treba iskoristiti 
prednosti sadašnjeg trenutka za unapreĊenje procesa regionalne suradnje. Prepoznavanje heterogeno-
sti jugoistoĉne Europe nuţno je za njezinu budućnost, a spremnost da se radi unutar nje i moţda pu-
tem nje jest sudbina regije. Ĉesto se previĊa da je endemski separatizam jugoistoĉne Europe doveo i 
do krize u produkciji znanja, što koĉi blagostanje regije i osuĊuje ju na sadašnje nazadovanje. Zato pr-
vi korak treba biti razvoj programa kulturne razmjene i panbalkanski susreti koji bi pokrenuli potporu 
ideji o balkanskoj uniji. 
KLJUĈNE RIJEĈI: Jugoistoĉna Europa, Balkan, Balkanska Unija, suradnja, kulturna razmjena 
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UNE VOIE POUR LES BALKANS VERS LA SOLUTION DU CONFLIT 
REGIONAL 
RÉSUMÉ 
Ce travail a été motivé essentiellement par la sensation que les divers peuples de l'Europe du 
sud-est partagent un futur commun. Le développement des Balkans dans la dernière décennie met en 
évidence un manque de collaboration entre les pays de cette région et l‟impossibilité pour les diverses 
communautés nationales de trouver la voie d‟une coexistence pacifique. L‟auteur espère que ce travail 
suscitera une discussion sur la possibilité de créer une fédération balkanique dans cette région et il cite 
le film-culte Matrix comme une comparaison avec la situation actuelle dans les Balkans. La clé de 
l‟intrigue réside dans le choix que doit faire un protagoniste entre les pilules bleues ou rouges: choix 
bien connu entre, d‟une part, la terre brûlée des antagonismes et des confrontations, et d‟autre part une 
coexistence paisible. Les options qu‟une puissance étrangère peut proposer pour solutionner les prob-
lèmes de la région ne peuvent jamais être durables si elles ne sont pas soutenues par les nations des 
Balkans; sans leur appui, elles ne sont qu‟une source de nouvelles confrontations. Les grandes puis-
sances ne font que passer sur la scène politique de la région, mais les gens qui vivent dans cette pén-
insule et la considèrent comme leur patrie, y restent et doivent supporter les conséquences des intru-
sions étrangères. C‟est pourquoi la création d‟une Union balkanique « consociationale » constitue une 
solution que les petits pays de l‟Europe du sud-est peuvent proposer pour la stabilisation de leur région. 
L‟intention de ce travail est de susciter un débat sur ce thème. L‟auteur considère que la question de 
l‟appartenance ethnique doit être examinée au niveau des libertés individuelles et des droits de 
l‟homme. Cela fournirait une base permettant de séparer les notions d‟État et de nation, et contribuerait 
à l‟établissement d‟une paix durable dans le sud-est européen. Ainsi, dans le cadre d‟une Union « con-
sociationale », les communautés ethniques balkaniques seraient considérées comme des associations 
libres, en marge de l‟organisation civile et politique du pays. Pendant les dix dernières années, le sud-
est européen est devenu dans les médias du monde entier un synonyme éculé d‟instabilité et d‟arrié-
ration. Les violents conflits interculturels ont ravagé la structure des sociétés balkaniques. La chute du 
rideau de fer a sorti de leur sommeil les fantômes de l‟histoire et ranimé les souvenirs du temps où cette 
région était volontiers désignée comme le « baril de poudre » de l‟Europe. Au seuil du 21ème siècle, le 
sud-est européen se trouve dans une situation identique, voire plus incertaine encore qu‟au seuil du 
20ème siècle. L‟auteur a la conviction que chaque tentative de solution des conflits dans cette région 
est vouée à l‟échec si elle n‟est pas placée dans le contexte du rêve d‟une Union balkanique. Cette 
Union ne pourrait être qu‟un État supranational, ou plutôt non-national, où chaque communauté eth-
nique, religieuse ou linguistique aurait sa propre infrastructure culturelle. Ce serait une association poli-
tique et économique qui faciliterait la coexistence de l‟intégrité culturelle. La spécificité d‟une telle 
formation politique réside dans le fait qu‟elle fournit des réponses au niveau individuel. L‟Union 
balkanique ne pourrait être qu‟un corps démocratique indépendant mû par un franc dévouement à la 
tâche commune. En tant que modèle macropolitique de régulation des conflits, elle n‟éliminerait pas les 
différences mais se contenterait de les gérer au service d‟une coexistence pacifique, sans porter aucune-
ment atteinte aux libertés individuelles. A la vue de la complexité du conflit balkanique, l‟auteur pense 
que la seule solution durable du problème du sud-est européen serait la création d‟une Union balkani-
que. La progression de cette idée neutraliseraient le conflit des intérêts divers dans la région car sa réa-
lisation ne peut se faire que moyennant une collaboration réelle et altruiste de tous les pays du sud-est 
européen. L‟Union ne supposerait pas seulement l‟engagement des gouvernements mais aussi la parti-
cipation active de tout un chacun. Une fois donné le premier coup de pouce, cet effort commun ferait 
boule de neige et ouvrirait la voie à la réalisation de cette idée. Les résultats d‟un tel effort ne peuvent 
qu‟aboutir à un changement positif notable dans cette région, ce qui est également important pour la sé-
curité et le bien-être de l‟Europe dans son ensemble. Les récents événements ont montré que les idées 
de collaboration plus étroite et d‟intégration ne sont pas sans écho dans cette région. Il faut exploiter les 
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avantages du moment présent pour promouvoir le processus de coopération régionale. La reconnais-
sance de l‟hétérogénéité du sud-est européen est une nécessité pour le futur de cette région, et sans 
doute son destin veut-il que l‟on soit prêt à travailler dans le cadre de cette hétérogénéité et à travers 
elle. On néglige souvent le fait que le séparatisme endémique du sud-est européen a aussi suscité une 
crise dans la production de connaissances, ce qui freine la région dans son accession au bien-être et la 
condamne à l‟arriération où elle se trouve aujourd‟hui. Aussi le premier pas à faire serait-il le déve-
loppement d‟un programme d‟échanges culturels et de rencontres pan-balkaniques, qui jetteraient les 
assises d‟un soutien à l‟idée d‟union balkanique. 
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